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Abstract:
In this paper we analyse the impact of governmental grant provision on plant performance.
To this end we utilise rich information derived from three data sources for the manufacturing
sector in Ireland, where grant provision has been an important part of the industrial policy.
We use a matching technique combined with a difference-in-differences estimator in the
empirical analysis. Our results indicate that particularly capital, technology and research
related, but also other types of, grants can provide an important impetus to plant survival and
employment growth. They thus provide some evidence of the effectiveness of active
industrial policy.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that many governments around the world provide financial assistance,
sometimes very generous, to manufacturing firms in some form or other. Such assistance is
often justified in a number of ways. For instance, it has been argued that new and small firms
face financial constraints (Hubbard, 1998) and governments may, hence, provide assistance in
the form of low-interest rate loans or cash grants in order to help these overcome such
constraints. Examples include the low interest loans of the Japan Development Bank (Beason
and Weinstein, 1996) and the similar programme by the Deutsche Ausgleichsbank for
Germany (Almus and Prantl, 2002). Also, government assistance may be aimed at improving
the adoption of new technologies in targeted firms, as for example the Manufacturing
Extension Partnership or the Small Business Innovation Program in the US (Jarmin, 1999,
Jarmin and Jensen, 1997, Wallsten, 2000). Furthermore, government assistance may be
aimed at firms in order to promote the industrial development of particular regions, such as
the Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) in the UK (Harris and Robinson, 2001) or the
regional policy subsidies administered by NUTEK in Sweden (Bergström, 2000).
1
Given the extent of financial assistance globally it is, of course, important to also
evaluate its effectiveness. In the empirical literature focusing on this issue ‘effectiveness’ is
defined in a number of ways; for example, in terms of improved technology use (Wallsten,
2000), higher productivity (Harris and Robinson, 2001, Bergström, 2000, Beaston and
Weinstein, 1996), or improved survival probabilities (Almus and Prantl, 2002, Jarmin, 1999).
The evidence on effectiveness is, however, mixed. Using micro-level data, Almus and Prantl
1 Of course, an argument against government assistance is that it does not allow market forces to work. If entry
and exit is a way of reallocating resources to “best” uses (e.g., Jovanovic, 1982) then encouraging entry of sub-
standard new firms or preventing exit of unproductive firms may lead to deadweight in the economy. In this2
(2002), Jarmin (1999) and Bergström (2000) show that the receipt of financial assistance can
improve the survival and growth prospects of the beneficiary firms, while Harris and
Robinson (2001) find that RSA receiving firms are able to improve their productivity. In
contrast, Bergström (2000) does not find that assisted firms are able to boost their
productivity. Similarly Beason and Weinstein (1996) use industry level data to evaluate the
effect of assistance in Japan and find no evidence of productivity enhancements as a result of
the industrial policy measures.
The present paper contributes to the literature on evaluating the effectiveness of
government grants given to industry. Specifically, we examine the impact of government
assistance in the form of grants being paid to manufacturing plants in the Republic of Ireland.
Ireland is a particularly interesting case study in this regard as grants have not only been used
to improve the performance of domestic firms, but also (and some observers would argue
much more importantly) in order to attract foreign firms to locate production facilities in the
country (e.g., KPMG, 2003). We investigate whether grants impacted on the performance of
grant receiving plants in terms of their survival prospects and employment performance.
There are a number of novelties in our paper compared to the previous literature. In
contrast to earlier papers, which aim at evaluating one particular programme, we have
information on all different forms of government grant assistance, since these are
meticulously recorded by Forfás, the government agency responsible for industrial
development, science and technology in Ireland. We can therefore evaluate the effectiveness
of total grants and distinguish the effects of different types of grants on plants’ performance.
Furthermore, given Ireland’s peculiar industrial structure, which relies heavily on foreign
paper we do not attempt to justify theoretically the use of government assistance but start from the premise that it
is widely used in practice.3
multinational firms, in particular in high-tech sectors (e.g., Görg and Strobl, 2002), we are
able to analyse the different effects of grants on domestic and foreign plants separately. As
we show below, this unearths some surprising differences across these two groups.
In conducting our analysis we link information obtained from three rich plant level
data sets collected by Forfás. First, we have access to unique plant level data on the
population of grants being paid to all manufacturing plants located in Ireland. Second, we
have data on the employment history of virtually the entire population of manufacturing
plants which allow us to determine their entry and exit. These two data sets are further linked
with data on plant level variables for a large sample of manufacturing plants.
A major concern in the analysis of the impact of government assistance programmes
on the performance of beneficiaries relative to non-beneficiaries is the issue of selectivity and
endogeneity. If the receipt of grants is related to some covariates that are correlated with
performance but are not taken into account in the evaluation, then any potential effect being
picked up in the evaluation may not necessarily reflect the true causal relationship between
grants and performance. In order to take account of this issue we use the propensity score
matching technique commonly used in the evaluation of labour market programmes (e.g.,
Dehejia and Wahba, 2002, Heckman et al., 1997), and we combine this technique with a
difference-in-differences analysis. This is motivated by recent studies which argue that
standard matching estimators are usually unsatisfactory, but in combination with difference-
in-differences methodology can have the potential to “...improve the quality of non-
experimental evaluation results significantly” (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000, p. 438).
Our results show that grant provision, in particular capital, technology and research
related, but also other types of grants, can provide an important impetus to plant performance,
both in terms of plant survival and employment growth. Differentiating effects across4
nationality of ownership, we find that plant survival of domestic plants is receptive to the
provision of capital, technology and research, as well as employment grants. The time a
foreign plant spends in the host country, in contrast, is not necessarily extended by
employment grants. Employment in both domestic and foreign plants is receptive to all
different types of grant provision.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we outline the history
and system of grant provision in Ireland. Section III describes our data sets used in the
empirical analysis. The matching technology which creates are comparable (across grant
provision) sample is discussed in the subsequent section. Empirical results of the effect of
grant provision on plant survival and employment growth are presented in Sections IV and V,
respectively. Concluding remarks are provided in the final section.
2 Government assistance to industry
2
The provision of grants for industrial development has played an important part in
most of the history of Irish industrial policy since the inception of the Irish republic in 1922.
After an initial protectionist phase, characterised by near autarky protecting the Irish large
agricultural and a very small domestic industrial base, stagflation and huge emigration in the
late 1940s and early 1950s made it clear that there was a need for a new approach to industrial
policy in Ireland. Grants for industrial development were first offered under the
Underdeveloped Areas Act of 1952, which was enacted to assist the provision of an
alternative source of employment to replace declining agricultural employment in rural
sectors, specfically by providing cash grants of up to 50 per cent of the cost of machinery and
equipment and up to 100 per cent of the cost of land and buildings and for the training of5
workers in certain underdeveloped areas of Ireland.
3 Additionally considerable explicit
efforts were made to attract foreign direct investment, for example through export tax relief.
In the late 1950s further concern with the deteriorating national economic situation led
to the erosion of the regional emphasis in favour of a more nationally oriented approach based
on export-led growth. Subsequently the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement was signed in
1965, which paved way for Ireland’s eventual membership of the EEC in 1973. In
conjunction with the existent export tax relief, access to European markets made Ireland an
attractive location for multinationals. At the same time the industrial grant system was
expanded, increasingly trying to develop the virtually non-existent technology intensive
sectors.
4 The essence of this industrial strategy has remained an integral part of Irish
industrial policy until today.
The agency primarily responsible for the provision of grant assistance in
manufacturing in the modern era was the Industrial Development Agency (IDA)
5 until 1994
6,
after which it was split into IDA Ireland and Forbairt - where the former is now responsible
for the grant provision to foreign owned firms while the latter resides over assisting
indigenous plants.
7 While there have been some changes in the provision of grants over time,
provision within the time period examined in our empirical analysis can be safely summarised
as follows (see KPMG, 2003). Projects suitable for assistance had to either involve the
production of goods primarily for export, be of an advanced technological nature for supply to
2 This summary of the grant provision in Ireland is based on information in Cassidy (2002), Kennedy et al
(1988), and Meyler and Strobl (2000).
3 See Meyler and Strobl (2000) for details.
4 While regional concerns still dominated in the 1970s, by the early 1980s a strategic industry approach,
encouraging the attraction of multinationals and the development of an indigenous sector in technology intensive
sectors became the primary concern. Nevertheless regions always remained of at least some concern.
5 This is also the principal organisation for promoting industrial development in Ireland
6 In the very early years, grant provision was under the authority of the Underdeveloped Areas Board before this
responsibility was taken over by the IDA.6
international trading or skilled self supply firms within Ireland, and/or be in sectors of the
Irish market that are subject to international competition. In order to be eligible the applicant
has to generally show that the project required financial assistance, is viable, has an adequate
equity capital base, and, through financial assistance, will be able to generate new
employment or maintain existing employment in Ireland, thereby increasing output and value
added within the Irish economy.
Additionally, there is also a generally more favourable view of more technology
intensive projects, those of firms located in (or planning to locate in) certain designated
regions, and those of a more entrepreneurial nature. The range of grants that have been
available to firms include capital grants, training grants, research and development grants,
rent subsidies, employment grants, feasibility study grants, technology acquisition grants, and
loan guarantees and interest subsidies. The actual grant level is generally very project
specific and subjected to a cost-benefit analysis. Additionally, total grant levels can generally
not exceed certain capital cost thresholds, usually between 45 and 60 per cent. Grants are
usually paid in pre-specified instalments such that further payment is often subject to periodic
reviews.
3 Description of the data
We utilise information from three data sources collected by Forfás, the Irish policy
and advisory board with responsibility for enterprise, trade, science, and technology in
Ireland. The first is the Forfás employment survey which is an annual plant level survey,
conducted since 1972, with information on the nationality of ownership, sector of production,
the start-up year and the level of employment each year. The response rate to this survey is
7 After 1998Forbairt become Enterprise Ireland as a consequence of a merger with the Irish Trade board.7
argued by Forfás to be essentially 100 per cent so that the data can be seen to cover the entire
population of manufacturing plants. This allows us to follow the life cycle of each plant as far
as this falls within our sample period. More precisely a plant is considered to be a `start up’
in its first year of positive employment, and to have exited once its employment level reaches
zero.
8 One should also note that Forfás defines foreign plants as plants that are majority-
owned by foreign shareholders, i.e., where there is at least 50 per cent foreign ownership.
While, arguably, plants with lower foreign ownership should still possibly considered to be
foreign owned, this is not necessarily a problem for the case of Ireland since almost all inward
foreign direct investment has been greenfield investment rather than acquisition of local firms
(see Barry and Bradley, 1997).
Our second data source is the Irish Economy Expenditure (IEE) Survey, collected
from 1983 until 1998. This is an annual survey of larger plants in Irish manufacturing with at
least 20 employees, although a plant, once it is included, is generally still surveyed even if its
employment level falls below the 20 employee cut-off point.
9 The response rate to this survey
has varied between 60 and 80 per cent. The information available from this source that is
relevant to the current paper are the level of output, the level of employment, and total wages.
Finally, Forfás has an exhaustive annual database on all grant payments that have been
made to plants in Irish manufacturing since 1972. Specifically, there is information on the
level of payment, the year of payment and the (aforementioned) explicit scheme under which
it was paid. For our empirical analysis we group schemes into three main categories, namely:
Capital, Technology and Research Related (capital, research and development, and
8 For plants where the first year of employment does not fall within our sample period frame we use information
on the start-up year to determine the length of its existence.
9 As discussed below, a unique plant identifier allows us to link data across information sources and hence we
are able to distinguish non-responses from actual plant exits from the market.8
technology acquisition grants), Employment Related (employment and training grants), and
Other Types (feasibility study grants, rent subsidies, loan guarantees and interest subsidies).
In terms of using these three data sources in conjunction with each other one should
note that Forfás provides each plant with a unique numerical identifier, which allows one to
link information across plants and years. For the analysis here we use the grant data for
classifying plants as grant recipients and the group of scheme, the IEE for all other plant level
variables used in the analysis, and the employment survey to determine plant entry and exit.
One should note that by linking information across data sources our sample consists of plants
of a mostly larger nature, that is generally of at least 20 employees.
While the matched data set used in the econometric analysis below covers the period
1983 to 1998 due to the nature of the IEE data, we can use the grant data from 1972 onwards
to chart the development of grant provision over this longer period. We have graphed total
grant provision, decomposed into the three types, in Figure 1. As can be seen, grant provision
was lower in the 1970s, peaking in the early 1980s, but has been fairly stable since the late
1980s. While capital, technology and research related and other types of grants played a
much greater role in the earlier era, employment related grants have since the mid 1990s been
the most important component of the Irish grant provision system. In Figure 2 we number
plants and their proportion receiving grants. Accordingly, while the number of plants in Irish
manufacturing has increased, in any year about 10 – 20 per cent of plants are supported by a
grant payment. While Figure 3 reveals that on average the amount received was much higher
in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, one discovers from Figure 4 that once one adjusts
for the size of the firm, this difference is not as stark.
[Figures 1 - 4 here]9
4 Matching and difference-in-differences methodology
The modelling problem is the evaluation of the causal effect of grant receipt on y ,
where y represents either plants’ probability of survival or level of employment. Let
{} 1 , 0 ∈ it GRT be an indicator of whether or not a plant received grants at time period t, and let
1
s it y + be the (log) hazard of exiting / level of employment at time t+s, 0 ≥ s . Also denote by
0
s it y + the employment (or exit hazard) of the plant had it not received any grants. The causal
effect of the receipt of grants for plant i at time period t + s is then defined as
0 1
s it s it y y + + − .( 1 )
The fundamental problem of causal inference is that the quantity
0
s it y + is unobservable.
Thus the analysis can be viewed as confronting a missing-data problem. Following the
microeconometric evaluation literature (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 2002, Heckman et al, 1997),
we define the average effect of grants on the plants receiving grants as
{ } {} {} 1 | 1 | 1 |
0 1 0 1 = − = = = − + + + + it s t it s t it s t s t GRT y E GRT y E GRT y y E (2)
Causal inference relies on the construction of the counterfactual for the last term in equation
(2), which is the outcome the grants-receiving plants would have experienced, on average, in
the absence of grants. This is estimated by the exit hazard / average employment of the plants
that never received grants, i.e.,
{} 0 |
0 = + it s it GRT y E (3)
The calculation of (3) raises the problem of selectivity. If the receipt of grants is
correlated with a number of observable plant characteristics but (3) were calculated as the
average for all non-grants receiving plants then we would obtain a biased estimate. An
important feature in the analysis is therefore the construction of a valid counterfactual, i.e., the10
selection of a valid control group that avoids the problem of selectivity. One way of doing so
is by employing matching techniques. The purpose of matching is to pair each grant-
receiving plant at each point in time with a non-grant plant in such a way that the latter’s
employment dynamics (or hazard pattern) can be studied to generate the counterfactual for the
grant-receiving plants.
Since matching involves comparing grants and non-grants plants across a number of
observable characteristics (e.g. productivity, employment, wages and industry characteristics),
it would be difficult to determine along which dimension to match the plants, or what type of
weighting scheme to use.
10 It is therefore desirable to perform the matching on the basis of a
single index that captures all the information from those variables. We adopt the method of
propensity score matching due to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) which suggests the use of the
probability of receiving grants conditional on plant specific characteristics, to reduce the
dimensionality problem.
Accordingly, we first identify the probability of receiving grants (or 'propensity score')
using the following probit model
) , ,
, , , , , ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1
dummies industry dummy regional dummy foreign
age labprod wages size GRT F GRT P it it it it it it − − − − = =
(4)
where size is measured in terms of log employment, wages are wages per worker, labprod is
output per worker in firm i relative to average output per worker in the industry, age is plant
age. Dummies are equal to one if the plant is foreign owned and if the firm locates in a non-
designated region, respectively. Furthermore, the model includes a full set of four digit
industry dummies. The choice of covariates attempts to capture, or be correlated with, some
10 This is usually referred to selection on observables.11
of the factors that the IDA may take into account when deciding on handouts of grants as
discussed above.
11
Now let it P denote the predicted probability of receiving grants at time t for plant i
(which is an actual grant receiver). A non-grants plant j, which is ‘closest’ in terms of its
‘propensity score’ to a grants plant, is then selected as a match for the latter using the ‘caliper’
matching method.
12 More formally, at each point in time
13 and for each grants plant i, a non-
grants plant j is selected such that
|} {| min
} { jt it grants no j jt it P P P P − = − >
∈ λ (5)
where λ is a pre-specified scalar. This type of matching procedure is preferable to
randomly or indiscriminately choosing the comparison group, because it is less likely to
induce estimation bias by picking plants with markedly different characteristics.
This paper then employs a difference-in-differences estimator on the matched plants to
isolate the role of grants in the employment dynamics (exit hazard) of plants.
14 This
combination of matching and difference-in-differences analysis arguably improves the
accuracy of the evaluation study (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000).
The version of the combined matching and difference-in-differences estimator used
can be described as follows. Firstly, the difference between the (log) hazard of exiting (or
average employment) before and after the receipt of grants, say y
g ∆ , is calculated. Then this
11 For illustration, a probit of this form on the pooled data is reported in Appendix 1. Note that the coefficients
are broadly as we would expect.
12 The matching is performed in Stata Version 7 using the software provided by Sianesi (2001).
13 Note that the matching strategy is only appropriate on a cross-section by cross-section basis. Once the matched
plants are identified, we pool all observations on them to form a panel of matched plants. This panel is used in
subsequent analyses.12
difference is further differenced with respect to the before and after differences for the
comparison control group, say
c y ∆ , to obtain the difference-in-differences estimator
y y
c g ∆ − ∆ = δ .
15 Defining GRANT as a dummy variable equal to one if the plant receives a
grant in time t, the regression
it it it u GRANT y + + = δ φ (6)
should produce a coefficient δ that can be interpreted as the average change in y due to
the receipt of grants. In order to control for possible observable factors that may be correlated
with changes in exit hazard or employment, we extend this basic framework by a vector of
regressors which consists of different variables depending on whether we are examining the
hazard model or the employment equation.
We implement the matching methodology on our linked data. Table 4.1 details the
number of grant receiving plans and matched plants by year. Table 4.2 provides summary
statistics for the matched and unmatched samples. As can be seen, in terms of grant recipients
versus non-recipients, the matched firms show more (relative) homogeneity with regard to
labour productivity, the incidence of foreign ownership, and age, while they are not too
different, at least on average, in terms of the other control variables. As a matter of fact, using
a simple t-test on the equality of means for each variable for each year, the hypothesis that
that these are equal across the two groups could not be rejected in almost all cases.
16 In terms
of disentangling differences within our matched group, which we will use for our subsequent
14 Having constructed the comparison group (say C) of plants that are similar to the grants plants (say G), a
standard matching estimator of the causal effect of grants can be written as ∑∑ − =
∈∈ G iC j
i ij i y w y ) ( δ where the
ij w are the weights placed on the comparison plant j, which are generated by the matching algorithm.
15 See Meyer (1994) for an excellent exposition of this methodology.
16 Detailed results are available from the authors.13
econometric analysis, one discovers that those firms that receive grants tend on average to be
larger, younger, less productive, and pay higher wages than those that do not receive grants.
The incidence of foreign ownership and the location of plants in the designated areas within
Ireland is, in contrast, fairly similar.
[Tables 4.1 – 4.2 here]
5 The Hazard Model
Following the related empirical literature (for example, Disney et al., 2003, Agarwal
and Audretsch, 2001, Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995) we utilise a Cox proportional hazard
model for the empirical analysis of the effect of grants on the hazard of exiting. This model
specifies the hazard function h(t) to be the following:
) (
0 ) ( ) (
t D GRANT X e t h t h
+ + =
δ β (7)
where h(t) is the rate at which plants exit at time t given that they have survived in t-1,
h0 is the baseline hazard function when all of the covariates are set to zero, X is a vector of
plant and industry characteristics postulated to impact on a plant’s hazard rate and D is a full
set of time dummies to capture economy wide shocks.
17
In line with the empirical literature (see Geroski, 1995) we include current plant size
(measured in terms of employment) as independent variable in the vector X as it appears to be
a stylised fact that large plants have better survival prospects than small ones, ceteris paribus.
Further plant level controls used are plant labour productivity (relative to the three digit
industry mean) and a nationality dummy which is equal to one if the plant is foreign owned.
As Görg and Strobl (2003) find, foreign-owned plants in Ireland are more likely to exit the
17 The Cox model is particularly suited since it does not require any restrictive assumptions regarding the
baseline hazard, such as for instance a Weibull or lognormal specification. As pointed out in the literature on14
industry than are domestic plants, all other things being equal. Also, industry growth
(measured as employment growth in the three digit industry) is included since one would
expect that plants in a growing industry will have higher survival rates as the competitive
pressure in a growing industry may be alleviated (Audretsch, 1991).
We calculate a number of alternative measures of grants received in order to capture
the effect of grants on plant survival. The first is a dummy variable equal to one if the plant
received any grant payments at time t. This variable amalgamates the effects of a number of
different grant types, as discussed above. In order to allow the potential effect on survival to
differ by grant type, we calculate, second, three different grant type dummies which take on
values of one if the plant received any employment related grants, capital, technology and
research related grants, or other grants at time t. Third, we also investigate whether the
amount of grants matters by including the log values of these three different grant types
received by plant i in time t. These three groups of variables capture any contemporaneous
effect of grants on plant survival. Arguably, one may also expect more long term effects. In
order to capture these we re-calculate the three types of variables not only for time t but for
the three year period t-2 to t. We decided on a three year period since we found when
experimenting with longer lags that after three years the effect of grants on survival largely
disappeared. Given that Görg and Strobl (2003) find different survival and employment
adjustment patterns for domestic and foreign plants in the Irish manufacturing sector we allow
the effect of grants to vary across the two nationality groups of plants.
By way of preliminary analysis we compare the survival of plants which receive any
type of grants with those in the control group, calculating Kaplan-Meier (K-M) survival
survival analysis, the semi-parametric modelling approach of the Cox proportional hazard model is advantageous
if the parametric form of the underlying baseline hazard function is not known with certainty.15
functions separately for plants of these two groups.
18 The functions are plotted in Figure 1.
Inspection shows that the survival function of plants that have received grants appears to be
below that of the control group. For example, the probability of a plant surviving up to the
age of 20 is 96 percent for control group plants compared with 94 percent for grant-receiving.
However, a log-rank test which tests for equality of the survival functions across the two
groups does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the two functions are not
statistically different (χ
2 = 1.56). Of course, the K-M functions do not allow us to control for
any other confounding effects. In order to do so we turn to the estimation of the hazard
model.
[Figure 5 here]
The results of estimating different specifications of equation (7) for the total sample of
plants are presented in Table 5. All estimations are stratified by sector. This allows for equal
coefficients of the covariates across strata (sectors), but baseline hazards unique to each
stratum (sector). They also include time dummies to control for any common macroeconomic
effects on plants’ survival prospects. The tables report hazard ratios, which allow a fairly
straightforward interpretation of the magnitude of the effect of the covariate on the hazard of
exiting.
First of all, one should note that the coefficients on the control variables turn out
largely as expected. Large plants and plants located in growing industries have higher
probabilities of survival, ceteris paribus. The coefficients on the foreign dummy and the
18 A K-M function gives the probability of surviving up to time t or beyond and is calculated as
() $() [ ] St n d n jj j
jt t j
=−
≤ ∏ ,w h e r ent is the population alive and dt is the number of failures respectively at
time t.16
labour productivity variable are not statistically significantly different from zero, implying
that there is no effect on the hazard of exiting from these variables.
Turning to the effect of total grants on survival of domestic plants we find that the
receipt of grants has a positive effect at time t, although there does not appear to be a more
long term effect from total grant payments (columns 1 and 2). Dividing total grants into the
three separate components we find evidence that both employment and capital, technology
and research grants positively affect survival of domestic plants. For example, in column (3)
where we consider the short term effect of grants we find that domestic plants that received
employment or capital, technology and research grants in t face hazards of about only one-
third (0.26 and 0.42, respectively) of domestic plants that did not receive such grants.
Column (4) indicates, however, that only capital, technology and research grants have a
positive effect when considering grant receipts between t and t-2. We are not able to discern
any statistically significant effects of other types of grants on survival probabilities of
domestic plants.
[Table 5 here]
The coefficients for the effect of grant receipts for foreign plants highlights further the
importance of capital, technology and research grants. From column (3) we find that plants
that receive capital, technology and research grants have exit hazards of only about 48 percent
of those plants that do not. Quite surprising, however, is that there is some evidence
(although only statistically significant in one case) that the receipt of employment grants is
positively correlated with the hazard of exiting. In other words, foreign plants that receive
employment grants may be more likely to exit, ceteris paribus, than foreign plants that do not
receive such financial assistance. One possible explanation is that employment related grants17
in foreign plants were mainly used to maintain current employment levels, that is were
provided to firms that may have already been in difficulty.
6 Employment equations
We now turn to the analysis of the effects of government assistance on employment
adjustment at the level of the plant. We extend equation (6) in order to control for possible
observable factors that may be correlated with changes in employment,
it t i it it it D f GRANT X y ε δ β + + + + = (8)
where y is log employment in plant i at time t, X includes the log average wage in the
plant, i f is a fixed effect to account for unobservable plant-specific characteristics and t D is
a full set of time dummies to capture economy-wide shocks.
Equation (8) is an unconditional labour demand model in the sense that the
employment function is not conditioned on the output of the plant. The coefficient on the
grant dummy variable (δ ) can be interpreted as the average employment effect of grants. For
example, δ > 0 would suggest that grants help create jobs. A number of studies that seek to
identify the labour market consequences of ownership change have employed variants of this
unconditional labour demand model (see, inter alia, Brown and Medoff, 1988 and McGuckin
et al., 1995).
The concept of unconditional labour demand is distinct from the argument that
underpins the idea of conditional (derived) labour demand schedules (see, for example,
Nickell, 1986 and Bresson et al., 1996). Such demand schedules condition labour demand on
the output produced by the plant (or to be more precise on expected product demand). Hence,
in the estimation of such a model we also include log output by plant i in the vector X in
equation 8. In a conditional labour demand framework, δ > 0 can be taken as evidence that18
plants in receipts of grants require more labour input to produce a given level of output. In
other words, δ captures the labour efficiency/ inefficiency effects of grants. The estimation of
both conditional and unconditional labour demand models helps distinguish between labour
efficiency-enhancing effect and pure job creation/destruction effect of grants.
We estimate both unconditional and conditional labour demand equations via fixed
effects techniques to control for the potential endogeneity of wages and output.
19 Given that
the hazard estimations above suggested that there are substantial differences between foreign
and domestic owned plants in their responses to grant receipts we also estimate the
employment equations separately by allowing for the impact of grants to vary across these
two groups of firms. Also, we focus only on the “long term” effects of grants by including
the variables for grant receipts at any time between t and t-2. The estimation results are
reported in Table 6. Note that, for both estimations, the coefficients on wages and output are
as expected. Wage increase causes statistically significant decrease in the level of labour
demand while an increase in output is associated with an increase in labour input.
Turning our discussion to the impact of grants on employment, Table 6 shows that
capital, technology and research grants represent the most important components of grants as
far as unconditional labour demand is concerned. For foreign plants, receipt of such grants in
the last three years leads on average to a 15.7% increase in labour demand, and a 1% increase
in the amount of these grants received causes a 2.3 % employment growth. It is interesting to
note that receipt of employment grants is not associated with as economically significant
effects, with a 10% increase in employment grants leading to less than one percent change in
employment. Finally receipt of “other” types of grants does not appear to have any effect on
19 In all specifications, Hausman tests comparing the fixed versus random effects models indicate that the former
is appropriate.19
foreign plants’ unconditional labour demand trajectory when the model is estimated with
grant dummies, while a small negative effect is detected when the log of grants size is used
instead.
For domestic plants capital, technology and research grants have similarly the more
pronounced effects on unconditional labour demand, although the effects are smaller
compared to foreign plants. As can seen from Table 6, employment grants and other types of
grants have also discernible positive employment effects. Overall our difference-in-
differences estimates of the impacts of government grants point to the conclusion that receipt
of such grants is conducive to economically as well statistically significant job creation.
The estimates
20 from the conditional labour demand show that, conditioning on
output, the receipt of other grants reduces employment for foreign plants (we find positive
effects amongst domestic plants). This indicates that some (modest) rationalisation in the use
of labour has occurred for foreign plants in receipt of other grants and, for given levels of
output, less labour is employed. By contrast receipt of capital, technology and research and
employment grants, which are positively associated with conditional labour demand for both
foreign and domestic plants, seems to lead to some inefficiency in the use of labour in both
foreign and domestic plants. For example, for a foreign plant in receipts of 10 percent more
capital, technology and research grants than otherwise equivalent (in terms of wages and
outputs) plant, employs 1% more workers. This finding is consistent with the interpretation
that plants are hoarding workers they may not need (given their expected output), at least in
the short run.
[Tables 6 here]
20 Here we are referring to the estimates based on the actual amount of grants received, rather than the model
with dummy variables.20
7 Conclusions
While many governments provide financial assistance to their firms, the evidence on
the effectiveness of this `strategy’ is not only fairly sparse but also mixed. In this paper we
set out to investigate whether the grant provision system in the Irish manufacturing sector has
succeeded in enhancing plant performance. Our results indicate that in general grant
payments have helped plants to survive longer in Ireland. This result is particularly clear-cut
for domestic plants, for which grants of all types have provided an important impetus. In
contrast, not all grant types have successfully aided multinational plant survival. We also find
that most grant provision has been a positive determinant of employment creation in domestic
and foreign plants.
In terms of policy relevance these empirical findings imply that grant provision can be
an effective means to enhance firm performance. For one, it can serve as an instrument of
employment creation. While it can also be an important impetus in plant survival, particularly
for domestic plants, policy makers may want to take note that it may not always ensure that
multinationals remain in the host country.21
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Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by grant
analysis time


























Table 4.2: Summary Statistics (Mean)
Grant Employ. Wage Rate Lab. Prod. Foreign DA Age
















































Table 5: Cox proportional hazard model (hazard rates reported)

























Foreign dummy 0.915 1.158 0.941 1.293 1.140 1.395
(0.24) (0.33) (0.17) (0.61) (0.36) (0.80)
Ln employment
size
0.767 0.728 0.774 0.775 0.761 0.773
(1.91)* (2.24)** (1.87)* (1.78)* (2.01)** (1.72)*
Relative labour
productivity
1.005 1.004 0.993 1.001 0.995 0.998
(0.15) (0.15) (0.29) (0.03) (0.24) (0.07)
Industry growth 0.412 0.379 0.342 0.351 0.344 0.334
(1.56) (1.63) (1.87)* (1.73)* (1.83)* (1.78)*
Foreign plants
Grant dummy t 0.635
(1.19)








Capital grant t 0.474 0.933
(1.99)** (2.16)**
Other grant t 0.565 0.914
(1.07) (1.23)
Employment
g r a n ttt ot - 2
1.287 1.047
(0.70) (0.93)









Grant dummy t 0.256
(3.47)***








Capital grant t 0.418 0.934
(1.70)* (1.27)
Other grant t 0.674 1.002
(0.74) (0.02)
Employment
g r a n ttt ot - 2
0.752 0.95328
(0.76) (0.77)








Observations 11748 11748 11748 11748 11729 11713
Robust z statistics in parentheses
*s i g n i f i c a n ta t1 0 % ;* *s i g n i f i c a n ta t5 % ;* * *s i g n i f i c a n ta t1 %
Estimations are stratified by sector and include time dummies29
Table 6: GRANT receipts and employment dynamics:
Is there a foreign/domestic differential effect?
(fix_all2)










log of grants size
Wages -0.162 -0.161 -0.515 -0.512




Employment grant t to
t-2
0.038 0.007 0.012 0.003
(3.27)*** (4.35)*** (1.55) (3.02)***
Capital grant t to t-2 0.157 0.023 0.065 0.010
(14.24)*** (16.18)*** (8.77)*** (10.10)***
Other grant t to t-2 -0.008 -0.004 -0.009 -0.003
(0.62) (2.61)*** (1.06) (2.76)***
Domestic plants
Employment grant t to
t-2
0.048 0.009 0.025 0.005
(4.40)*** (5.19)*** (3.37)*** (4.06)***
Capital grant t to t-2 0.117 0.020 0.050 0.009
(11.21)*** (12.55)*** (7.26)*** (8.29)***
Other grant t to t-2 0.043 0.008 0.021 0.004
(3.92)*** (4.55)*** (2.85)*** (3.53)***




Observations 13219 13185 13219 13185
Number of plants 1567 1567 1567 1567
Note:
(i) Time dummies are included in all specifications
(ii) Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
(iii) Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(iv) The tests for the endogeneity of wages and output was conducted via Hausman tests by comparing the
fixed effects estimates with the random effects one. In all case output and wages were found to be
endogenous, vindicating the use of the fixed effects specification.30





















Standard errors in parentheses
Regression includes four digit sector dummies
*s i g n i f i c a n ta t1 0 % ;* *s i g n i f i c a n ta t5 % ;* * *s i g n i f i c a n ta t1 %